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RUTH BADER GINSBURG: EXTENDING
THE CONSTITUTION
AMY WALSH*

INTRODUCTION

"A prime part of the history of our Constitution ... is the
story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to
people once ignored or excluded.
VMI's [Virginia Military
Institute's] story continued as our comprehension of 'We the
People' expanded."1
This phrase, taken from the text of United States v. Virginia,2'
is part of Ruth Bader Ginsburg's reasoning as to why The Virginia
Military Institute's (VMI) policy of denying admission to women
was offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.3 It is fitting that Justice Ginsburg used this phrase,
for Ginsburg's work itself is a prime part of the history of women
achieving equality in the eyes of the fundamental law of our land.
From litigating the first case to hold that discrimination on the
basis of gender is inconsistent with the principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment 4 to writing the opinion in the Virginia
decision, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a central force in
extending the protection of the Constitution to women.5 By
examining Ginsburg's core beliefs with respect to gender
discrimination, and analyzing how those beliefs take shape in the
broader context of the Virginia decision, this Comment examines
how Ginsburg is likely to influence the U.S. Supreme Court on
gender issues in decisions in the years to come. Part I of this
Comment provides an overview of the progress Ginsburg has made
* J.D. Candidate, Jan. 2000.
1. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (citing Richard
Morris, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)).

2. 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).
3. Id. at 546. The Virginia Court found that VMI failed to provide the
"exceedingly persuasive" justification that is required of all gender-based
classifications in order be constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.
4. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
5. See generally Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One
Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335 (1992)
(providing an overview of the gender discrimination cases Ginsburg litigated
in the 1970's).

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:197

since she began fighting gender discrimination. Part II examines
those core personal beliefs which motivate and shape Ginsburg's
strategy to end gender discrimination in the law.
Part III
examines the major Supreme Court decisions in the area of gender
discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV
analyzes the Virginia opinion in terms of how that opinion
potentially changed the standards for examining gender
discrimination claims as well as how the opinion outlined the
battles Ginsburg still must fight in order to accord women the full
power of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.

FROM THE "EMPTY CUPBOARD" TO INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: A
BROAD OVERVIEW

In 1971, armed with the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Ruth Bader Ginsburg began to wage a
war in United States courtrooms on sex discrimination in our
country.6 Because there existed no historical basis for the premise
that women were among the persons Congress meant to protect
when they drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, it was in many
ways a weak and unproven weapon with which to fight gender
discrimination.
In fact, Ginsburg often referred to the
Constitution as an "empty cupboard" for women.8 By this she
meant that apart from giving women the right to vote, the
Constitution offered women no protections from sexual

6. See id. at 336-37 (noting that in 1971, Ginsburg became the first
director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project).
Further, 1971 marked the year Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), was decided.
Id. at 338. Ginsburg was co-counsel for the appellant in this pivotal case
which unanimously held that an Idaho statute which gave preference to males
over females in the appointment of estate administrators was unconstitutional
on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
While the Reed Court did not apply the strict scrutiny test that Ginsburg
advocated, they did determine that such a classification on the basis of sex
was subject to scrutiny. Id. at 339. Reed was the first time the Supreme
Court upheld a claim of sex-based discrimination. Id. at 338-39; David Cole,
Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2
LAW & INEQ. J. 33, 53 (1984) (providing an overview of Ginsburg's litigation
strategy in the 1970's).
7. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 451, 452-53 (1978) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sex Equality] (pointing out
that the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates sex was
one of three grounds legislators could base classifications upon without doing
offense to the Equal Protection Clause). The word "male," found nowhere else
in the Constitution, is also used three times in the Fourteenth Amendment,
each time in relation to the word "citizen." Id.
8. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenthand Equal
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 164 [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments].
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discrimination. 9 Cognizant that history and precedent were not on
her side, Ginsburg became involved, as an attorney, in cases which
would serve to awaken the Supreme Court to the reality that the
law's "differential treatment of men and women," largely based on
over broad and outdated notions about the way that women
"naturally" are, served to "contribute to women's subordination their confined 'place' in a man's world."" As part of her strategy,
Ginsburg argued to the Supreme Court that legal classifications
based solely on gender should be considered "suspect," thereby
making them subject to the strictest scrutiny when challenged
Ginsburg's battle was
under the Equal Protection Clause.11
successful on two fronts. First, she persuaded the Supreme Court
to dynamically interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to include
women, thereby giving women a new tool for combating gender
Second, the Supreme Court adopted a
discrimination. 12
9. Id. at 161.
10. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the
Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970's, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 11, 18 (1989)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Feminist Legal Thought] (noting that "[t]he Supreme
Court needed basic education before it was equipped to turn away from the
precedents in place .... A teacher from outside the club ... knows she must

keep it comprehensible and digestible, not too complex or intimidating, or risk
losing her audience.").
11. See Brief for Appellant at 14-59, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(No.70-4) [hereinafter Reed Brief] (setting forth Ginsburg's argument that
laws drawn on the basis of gender should be subject to strict scrutiny);
Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 7, at 468 (noting that at the time Reed was
decided, the Court adhered to a two-tier standard of review for law challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause). The lowest tier, which encompasses most
legislation, requires only that the law is "rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective." Id. Most laws are able to survive this test. Id. The
higher tier, reserved for challenged actions involving fundamental rights or
suspect categorizations such as race, national origin and alienage, requires
that the action in question is justified by a compelling governmental interest
and that the classification is necessary to fulfill the interest. Id. See generally
Cole, supra note 6, at 53-54; Markowitz, supra note 5, at 335 (detailing
Ginsburg's litigation strategy with respect to sex discrimination claims).
12. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that a
federal statute which allowed servicemen to automatically receive benefits for
their wives, whether or not they were financially dependent, while requiring
servicewomen to prove that their husbands relied on them for over one half of
their support before they could qualify for the same benefits, was inconsistent
with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection); see also Markowitz,
supra note 5, at 342 (noting that while the Reed Court did not explicitly reveal
that recognition of gender discrimination was a factor in overturning the law
in question, Reed was the case which first gave women hope that sex-based
classifications would be found to be inconsistent with the equal protection
clause). But see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1975) (expounding that the framer's intent to apply the
Fourteenth Amendment only to racial discrimination may "deter boldly
dynamic judicial interpretation in this area").
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heightened standard of scrutiny for reviewing sex-based equal
protection claims. 13 However, she was not able to convince the
Supreme Court that gender-based classifications were inherently14
"suspect," and thus subject to the strictest form of judicial review.
Now, however, in her role as a Supreme Court Justice, Ginsburg is
clearly in a position to influence the Court to accord women the
full force of the Fourteenth Amendment and to take the final step
of declaring all gender-based classifications "suspect." In fact,
Justice Ginsburg had the first opportunity to speak on this subject
of such great personal import when she penned the majority
opinion in United States v. Virginia." That decision, which
arguably took the Court one step closer to adopting a strict
scrutiny standard of review for gender-based claims, resounded
with the themes Ginsburg
advocated throughout her career as a
6
scholar and litigator.
II.

THE CORE BELIEFS

A. Benign Classifications:"The pedestal upon which women have
been placed has all too often, upon closer
inspection, been revealed
17
as a cage"

One central theme that pervades Ruth Bader Ginsburg's work
13. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that sex-based
classifications must "serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives" in order to pass
constitutional muster); Markowitz, supra note 5, at 356 (providing an analysis
of the Craig holding).
14. Cole, supra note 6, at 63-64 (commenting that in Frontiero v.
Richardson, the Supreme Court did use the strict scrutiny standard of review
in striking down a federal statute which automatically labeled servicemen's
wives as dependents but required servicewomen's husbands to prove that they
relied on their wives for over one half of their support before they could be
considered dependents). Frontiero, however, was merely a plurality opinion
and the strict scrutiny standard was not used in subsequent cases. Id. at 64.
15. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
16. See Karen Lazarus Kupetz, Equal Benefits, Equal Burdens: "Skeptical
Scrutiny" for Gender ClassificationsAfter United States v. Virginia, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1333, 1366 (1997) (suggesting that the standard used in the
Virginia decision, which Justice Ginsburg called "skeptical scrutiny," is a
tougher standard to meet than the intermediate standard previously used);
Kathryn A. Lee, Intermediate Review "With Teeth" In Gender Discrimination
Cases: The New Standard in United States v. Virginia, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 221, 234 (1997) (submitting that the standard articulated in
Virginia is a new, higher level of scrutiny).
17. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the
Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 816 (1978) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Benign Classification] (noting that this quote, which was paraphrased in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), originally appeared in Sail'er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20 (1971)).
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as a scholar, a litigator, and a judge, is her deep distrust for any
sort of labeling or pigeonholing of the female sex.' In fact, much of
the litigation Ginsburg participated in during the 1970's centered
on uncovering the way that the law perpetuates the subtle labels
that society places on men and women.'9 In the beginning, the
chief challenge was forcing the Supreme Court to understand that
the law's preferential treatment of women was ultimately harmful
and oppressive - not beneficial." Originally, special treatment of
women by the law, known as benign classification, was thought to
favor and protect women. 2' In order to make the justices connect
protection with oppression, Ginsburg had to awaken them to the
reality that the labels they sought to perpetuate were outdated
stereotypes, far from the reality of 1970's women, and that these
stereotypes became self-fulfilling prophesies.22
Thus, it is fitting that Ginsburg believes the most important
case of the 1971-1981 series of gender discrimination cases is
Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld. 23

Weinberger is a case where

the

18. See generally id. (outlining a number of cases which demonstrate the
negative effects of the law's "preferential" treatment of women).
19. Ginsburg, Feminist Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 14. Ginsburg
notes that her goal while working on the ACLU's Women's Rights Project was
to "pursue a series of cases that might illuminate the most common instances
of gender distinctions in the law." Id. Ginsburg further adds that the
litigation of the 1970's helped dispel the notion that there were proper spheres
in which men and women had to stay. Id. at 17.
20. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the
Constitution,6 L. & INEQ. J. 17, 20 (1988) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Remarks on
Women]. See also Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution,supra note 12, at 15
(recounting a conversation Supreme Court Justice Potter had in 1973 with
Harvard law students ruminating over why women who can "attack laws that
unreasonably discriminate against her while preserving those that favor her"
would feel the need for an Equal Rights Amendment). Id. Ginsburg also
quotes Potter as saying that he "knows [unreasonable gender discrimination]
when he sees it." Id.
21. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (holding that a Florida
statute setting forth that only women who volunteer for jury service shall be
selected was not inconsistent with the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(holding that a Florida statute allowing widows but not widowers a property
tax exemption did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
22. See Ginsburg, Remarks on Women, supra note 20, at 21 (observing that
pervasive social changes in the 70's, including women taking jobs outside the
home in large numbers, helped the Supreme Court confront the unavoidable
reality that it was no longer safe to stereotype women as homemakers); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 14
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 361, 363 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, State of the Art]
(explaining that laws based on gender stereotypes keep men and women from
making life choices based on their true talents and preferences).
23. 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretationsof the Equal
ProtectionClause 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 41, 43 (1986).
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Supreme Court finally demonstrated a willingness to "look
beneath the surface of 'benign' or 'compensatory' rationalizations
and to strike classifications based on the notion that social roles
are preordained by sex." 24 In Wiesenfeld, the widower of a working
mother who died during childbirth applied for Social Security
benefits to aid in the care of himself and his newborn son.29
However, he was told that such benefits were available, per the
Social Security Act, to mothers only. 26 Represented by American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorneys, including Ginsburg, the
widower challenged the Act.27 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
overturned the Act, agreeing with Ginsburg's assessment that
such a law denigrated the value of a female breadwinner's
support.28
While the defense made a rational argument that
widows as a group did in fact need more financial aid than
widowers, the Court held that such generalizations reflecting the
reality of the average person would no longer hold up under
scrutiny. 29 This line of thinking echoed Ginsburg's argument in
the Wiesenfeld brief which stated that refusing assistance to a
father/caretaker assumes that: "because male/breadwinner/female/
child caregiver stereotypes are accurate for some individuals, the
government has the right to apply them to all individuals - and,
indeed, to shape its official policy toward the end that the
stereotypes shall continue to be accurate. '
Thus, Wiesenfeld encapsulated two of Ginsburg's core
arguments: first, laws based upon assumptions about how men or
women "are" serve to oppress those who do not fit within the
stereotype and become self-fulfilling prophesies; and second, legal
classifications based on gender merit closer scrutiny to discern
what their actual purpose is.
B. Equal Treatment Under the Law
The reverse side of Ginsburg's skepticism toward benign

24. See Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 14 (setting
forth Ginsburg's belief that the Wiesenfeld holding potentially represented a
new direction for gender discrimination cases).
25. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 636.

26. Id.
27. Id.; Markowitz, supra note 5, at 349-50.
28. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 636; Cole, supra note 6, at 75-76.
29. Ginsburg, Remarks on Women, supra note 20, at 22.

30. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 23,
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (No. 73-1892); Markowitz,
supra note 5, at 350. See also Ginsburg, Benign Classification, supra note 17,

at 819 (discussing the importance of the fact that the Court also held that
merely claiming that a statute has a benign or compensatory purpose will not

stop courts from taking a second look to determine if the statute has an
underlying purpose or effect that is perhaps not so benign).
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classifications is her belief that the law should treat men and
women equally."
Ginsburg acknowledges that she has been
criticized for playing by men's rules and for providing
opportunities only to those who were willing to be treated like
men." Clearly, asking for the laws to treat men and women the
same fails to take into account that the laws are made largely by
men and arguably could be characterized as "burdening both men
and women."33 However, Ginsburg believes that it would be
dangerous to make laws and policies to incorporate an ostensibly
womanly way of thinking or a feminine reality. 3' Ginsburg feels
that admitting there is a particularly male or female approach to
things, even if that approach is not being advanced in a negative
way, is to pigeonhole individuals in yet another manner.35 In an

31. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on the 1980's Debate over
Special Versus Equal Treatment for Women, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 143 (1986)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Special Versus Equal Treatment] (arguing that special
treatment of women ultimately serves to disadvantage them); see also Kathryn
Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 865-67 (1997)
(explaining that Ginsburg's approach is called the "equality theory" and is
based on the idea that women are "functionally indistinguishable" from men).
The criticism of this theory is that it does not fully appreciate the complex
reality of women. Id. at 865. In particular, the "equality theory" may seem
deficient when women, who secured their positions on the premise that they
could perform just like men, became pregnant yet wanted to stay on at their
jobs. Id. at 867. Women attempting to balance both family and professional
responsibilities found themselves trying to fit into an institution that was not
designed to meet their dual roles. Id.; Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer,
United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with
Ramifications for Pregnancy,Parenting,and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845,
851-58 (providing a short summary of "equal treatment," "equal results" and
other prevalent models for achieving gender equality).
32. Ginsburg, Special Versus Equal Treatment, supra note 31, at 143-44.
33. Ginsburg, Feminist Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 17.
34. Ginsburg, Special Versus Equal Treatment, supra note 31, at 148-49.
See also Abrams, supra note 31, at 867-71 (providing a summary of what is
known as the "difference theory," which proposes that women's differences
should be accommodated so that they can end up "as well off as their male
counterparts"). Id. at 867. See also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 31, at 852
(noting that the difference theory does not claim that women are in any way
inferior -just different - and that those differences should be recognized).
35. Ginsburg, Special Versus Equal Treatment, supra note 31, at 148.
Appropriately, Ginsburg disassociates herself with either a typically male or
female personality, and claims to have noticed no special sex-based
propensities in all her years of practicing and teaching law. Id. at 148.
Further, Ginsburg adheres to her belief in equal treatment under the law even
when it comes to pregnancy issues. Id. at 144-46. In response to arguments
that women deserve special favors because of their unique capacity as
childbearers, Ginsburg asserts that any favoritism in the law has typically
come back to haunt women and that she prefers a system which encourages
men and women to jointly share in the responsibility for child care. Id. at 14546. In Ginsburg's ideal world, men would be given incentives to equally
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article she wrote on the special treatment/equal treatment debate,
Ginsburg quotes Georgetown law professor Wendy Williams as
saying, "[s]pecial treatment comes with strings attached.
Historically, it comes with lower wages, employer skepticism and
the resentment of co-workers."36 Ginsburg firmly believes that
while alert feminists may be able to ferret out a real favor from
paternalistic policies disguised as favors, few judges and laypeople
37
can.
C. Respecting the Original Intent: A Careful Revolutionary
Another defining characteristic of Justice Ginsburg is her
understanding and respect for the limitations upon the judicial
branch.38 Justice Ginsburg strongly advocated the Equal Rights
Amendment and saw it as the foundation the Supreme Court
needed to boldly confront sex discrimination.39 While Ginsburg
does not believe the Court should be unduly constrained by the
original framers' intent, she attributes the lack of historical basis
for sexual equality as one factor that keeps the Court from
eliminating all gender-based discrimination in the law.4 °
Without the amendment, Ginsburg has expressed her
appreciation for the need to move slowly and build precedent: "[a]
partake in the child-rearing process. Id. See also Ginsburg, Gender and the
Constitution,supra note 12, at 34-36 (citing with approval then Director of the
Department of Labor's Women's Bureau Elizabeth Koontz's proposition that
there is a big difference between child-bearing and child-rearing); Remarks of
the HonorableRuth Bader Ginsburg,Conference on Civil Rights Developments,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Civil Rights
Developments] (stating that treating pregnancy as anything other than a
temporary physical disability is to invite paternalistic treatment of women).
36. Ginsburg, Civil Rights Developments, supra note 35, at 1110.
37. Id.
38. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Judicial Voice] (quoting Justice
Holmes as saying, "judges do and must legislate" but "they are confined from
molar to molecular motions").
39. Ginsburg, Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, supra note 8, at
173. The Equal Rights Amendment was originally proposed by the National
Woman's Party in 1923 and was designed as a correlative to the Nineteenth
Amendment. Id. at 172. The amendment, which was "framed as a basic
human rights norm," was meant to serve two purposes. For a two-year period,
it was to order state and federal legislatures to revise sex-based laws. Id. at
173. At the close of the two-year period following ratification, the law would
then serve as "a clear source for the constitutional principle [that] men and
women are equal before the law." Id. While Ginsburg believed that the job of
ridding sex-based classifications could be done without the proposed
amendment, Ginsburg believes that history shows that such change will occur
more slowly "absent the stimulus explicit constitutional commitment would
supply." Id. at 174.
40. Ginsburg, Remarks on Women, supra note 20, at 17; Ginsburg, Gender
and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 42.
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court too sure of itself on these matters may, in its zeal, take a
giant stride, only to find itself perilously positioned on an unstable
doctrinal limb."4' While Justice Ginsburg does not believe that the
court should always lag behind the legislature in advancing
constitutional doctrine,42 she has remarked, uncritically, that with
respect to changes in the area of gender discrimination, the Court
has neither been in front of nor behind social change." Instead,
she likens the court's role to "an amplifier - sensitively responding
to, and perhaps moderately accelerating" the move toward
equality."
III. THE BUILDING BLOCKS: REED,45 FRONTIERO, 6 CRAIG47 AND
HOGAN 4"
Having established Justice Ginsburg's respect for the need to
build precedent, the next part of this Comment focuses on the key
cases in the area of gender discrimination.
Reed v. Reed4" was the first case to hold that a law which
discriminated on the basis of gender was incompatible with the
Fourteenth Amendment." In Reed, the Supreme Court overturned
an Idaho statute which preferred men over women as estate
administrators.'
Reed was groundbreaking in the sense that,
although the government proffered a rational justification for
preferring men over women: reducing the number of hearings
necessary to determine who should be the estate administrator,
the Court found that the statute did not meet the basic rational

41. See Ginsburg, Remarks on Women, supra note 20, at 25 (criticizing Roe
v. Wade as an example of a decision that went "too far in the change it ordered
with incomplete justification" for its actions). Ginsburg believes that this
resulted in a legislative backlash. Id.; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts
on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375,
377-82 (1985) (contrasting the slow, careful steps the Supreme Court took in
changing law in the area of gender discrimination with the huge leap the court
took in legalizing abortion).
42. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 38, at 1206.
43. Ginsburg, Remarks on Women, supra note 20, at 24.
44. Id. See also Ginsburg, Feminist Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 17
(stating that the litigation of the 1970's, which was largely a process of
educating judges as to gender discrimination, accomplished about as much as
could be expected for that early time and that now the most sensible
battleground may be the legislature).
45. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
47. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
48. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
49. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
50. Id. at 76-77; Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, supra note 12, at
10.
51. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
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relationship test required under the Equal Protection Clause. 2
Further, the Reed Court seemed to make a break away from the
bare-minimum rational relationship test by requiring that laws
drawn on gender lines "rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relationship" to the legislative objective."
Two years after Reed was decided, the Supreme Court took
54
another big step in deciding Frontiero v. Richardson.
In that
case, the Supreme Court struck down a statute which provided
that servicewomen had to prove that their husbands were reliant
on them for over one half of their support before they could qualify
for benefits as dependents, whereas wives automatically qualified
for benefits, whether or not they were truly dependent.5
In
Frontiero,four justices agreed that sex should be labeled a suspect
criterion, meaning that it would be entitled to the strictest
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."
Four justices
52. Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 7, at 458 (citing Gunther, In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972)). But see id. (noting that Justice
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, did give the appearance of adhering to
traditional equal protection analysis by saying that "[t]o give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); see also, Markowitz, supra note 5, at 341
(explaining that while the Court "ostensibly" used "rational basis review,"
application of a rational basis test would have prevented such a position);
Cole, supra note 6, at 62-63 (noting that Court interpreters saw Reed as
demanding "something more than the traditional deferential scrutiny").
53. Ginsburg, State of the Art, supra note 22, at 362.
54. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See also Markowitz, supra note 5, at 343 (noting
that Ginsburg filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) in Frontiero). Ginsburg and the ACLU filed the
jurisdictional statement in Frontiero; however, Ginsburg later entered into
disagreements with the attorneys for the Southern Poverty Law Center, the
group that litigated Frontiero in the lower court, over who should argue the
case in front of the Supreme Court. Id. Further, Ginsburg couldn't convince
the Southern Poverty Law Center that they should argue for strict scrutiny.
Id.
55. Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91; Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 7,
at 462.
56. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 682; see also Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra
note 7, at 463 (explaining that classifications on the basis of race, national
origin, religion and alienage are "suspect" and thus subject to strict scrutiny);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving
American Ideal, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3-4 (1977) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Full
Members] (observing that of the two ways one can trigger strict scrutiny:
fundamental rights and suspect categorization, advocates of gender equality
have focused on equating sex with suspect classifications such as race on the
premise that sex, like race, "is a visible, immutable biological characteristic
that bears no necessary relationship to ability"). Ginsburg further notes that
equating sex with race has been questioned because of the fact that women,
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however, is a mere plurality, and the fifth vote never
materialized. 57 On the other hand, the decision did reinforce the
tentative progress that was made in Reed.58
The Supreme Court finally articulated the standard by which
gender discrimination claims would be measured in Craig v.
Boren. 9 In Craig, a case in which Ginsburg filed an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the ACLU, the court struck down an Oklahoma
statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2 percent beer to women
under the age of 18 and men under the age of 21.0 Ginsburg's
brief explained that while at first glance the statute appeared to
discriminate against men, "lulpon deeper inspection, the gender
line drawn by Oklahoma is revealed as a manifestation of
traditional attitudes about the expected behavior of males and
females, part of the myriad signals and messages that daily
underscore the notion of men as society's active members, women
as men's quiescent companions.""
In response, the Court in Craig explicitly established a
heightened standard of review for gender-based classifications. 2
In order to meet the Craig test, the party seeking to uphold the
challenged act must show that the gender classification promotes
an important governmental objective and that the classification is
substantially related to the important objective. 3 In Craig, the
government's objective was to decrease incidents of drinking and

unlike minorities, are a numerical majority - not a "discrete and insular
minority" - subject to the whims of greater political powers. Id. at 4. Ginsburg
points out that the "discrete and insular minority" argument fails to take into
account that well into the twentieth century, women were denied the vote and
were in effect politically silenced. Id. Further, being a discrete and insular
minority has its advantages in that it is easier to organize small pockets of the
population. Id. Women, on the other hand, are spread out in every region,
race and economic class. Id.
57. See Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 7, at 463 (noting that a major
reason the Court stopped short of labeling sex as a suspect class is that the
drafters of the Constitution showed no concern that men and women be equal
in the eyes of the law). This sentiment was expressed by Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion which warned that the Court must be careful to interpret
the Constitution - not amend it. Id. See also Ginsburg, State of the Art, supra
note 22, at 363 (postulating that the justices were waiting to see if the Equal
Rights Amendment passed before they categorized sex as a suspect
classification).
58. See Cole, supra note 6, at 62-63 (commenting that Ginsburg used the
Reed holding to build her argument in Frontiero).
59. 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
60. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210.
61. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 11,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (No. 75-628) [hereinafter Craig Brief];
Cole, supra note 6, at 81.
62. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
63. Id. at 197, 204; Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 7, at 468.
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driving, its theory being that men drink and drive more than
women.' The court found, however, that only 2% of men aged 1821 were arrested for drunk driving."
Thus, conditioning the
ability to purchase alcohol on gender was not substantially related
to the stated goal of preventing drinking and driving, and the
statute was struck down.66
The Craig test was reaffirmed in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,67 a case where a male plaintiff successfully
challenged the admission policy of a state-supported nursing
school which was designated for women only. 8 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, found that the
school failed to meet the burden of showing an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for upholding a statute which
discriminates on the basis of gender. 9 Justice O'Connor notes that
burden can only be met by showing that the gender-based
classification furthers an important governmental interest and
that the discriminatory 70 means used are substantially related to
furthering that interest.
Mississippi claimed that their objective in maintaining an allwomen's nursing school was to compensate women for past
discrimination. 7' In discrediting the proffered objective, O'Connor
found that Mississippi did not prove that women faced any
barriers in entering the field of nursing." Rather, the Court found
that the women-only admission policy served to perpetuate the

64. CraigBrief,supra note 61, at 25-26.
65. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201; Cole, supra note 6, at 82.
66. Craig, 429 U.S. at 202.
67. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
68. Id. at 720-21, 733.
69. Id. at 724.
70. Id. at 723. The Hogan opinion's interpretation of the Craig test
underscored some important points about the test. For one, Justice O'Connor
emphasizes that application of the two-prong Craig test must be performed
without any "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of men and
women." Id. at 724-25. Further, the governmental objective itself must be
carefully examined to see if it reflects any inherent ideas about appropriate
roles and behavior for women which would render it illegitimate. Id. at 72425. O'Connor also stresses that in determining whether there is a substantial
relationship between the governmental objective and the means chosen, one
must use a "reasoned analysis" rather than a "mechanical application" of
stereotypical ideas about appropriate roles for men and women. Id. at 726.
Additionally, while an objective genuinely designed to compensate women for
past wrongs can qualify as a legitimate objective, automatically claiming a
compensatory purpose will not satisfy constitutional requirements. Id. at 728.
71. Id. at 727.
72. Mississippi v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982). In fact, O'Connor notes
that the year before the Mississippi University for Women's nursing school
opened its doors, 1970, women accounted for 94 percent of the nursing degrees
awarded in Mississippi and 98.6 percent nationwide. Id.
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idea that nursing is a woman's job.73 Mississippi also claimed that
excluding men from the nursing school protected women who were
negatively affected by having males in the classroom.74 However,
this argument was discredited by the fact that men were allowed
to audit the nursing courses . In short, because Mississippi failed
to set forth a legitimate objective, the Court found that the nursing
school's admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
IV.

THE VMI DECISION: SKEPTICAL SCRUTINY UNVEILED

Twenty-five years after the Reed decision, United States v.
Virginia77 gave Ruth Bader Ginsburg occasion to speak from the
other side of the bench on the appropriate standard of review for
gender discrimination claims brought under Equal Protection
Clause. Just as court watchers sensed that something new was in
the wind after the Reed decision, it is clear that the Virginia
decision also represented a subtle shift in the way gender-based
classifications will be analyzed by the Supreme Court. 8
A.

The ProceduralHistory

Virginia arose when the United States sued the
Commonwealth of Virginia on the grounds that its maintenance of
an all-male military academy violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 79 The District Court, relying on Mississippi v. Hogan, set
forth that the defendants must show an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for classifying on the basis of sex by demonstrating
that the "discrimination serves important governmental
objectives" and that the "discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."" The
District Court, reasoning that single-sex education is beneficial,
found that Virginia's proffered objective, to provide diverse
educational experiences, was a legitimate one which reaped
measurable gains.8 ' Having accepted single-sex education as an
73. Id.
74. Id. at 730.
75. See id. at 730-31 (pointing out that men who audit courses at the
nursing school are allowed to "participate fully" in classes). Justice O'Connor
also points out that the record is devoid of any evidence that men's presence in

nursing schools causes the teachers to alter their teaching styles or that men
dominate the classroom in co-educational nursing schools. Id.
76. Id. at 732-33.
77. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
78. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Scalia claims that the
majority's opinion "drastically revises our established standards for viewing
sex-based classifications." Id.
79. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991).
80. Id. at 1410; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
81. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
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important governmental objective, the District Court necessarily
found that excluding women was the only way to achieve that
goal."2
Thus, Virginia satisfied the traditional "important
governmental objective with substantially related means test" at
the District Court level.
In the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however,
Virginia's objective of providing diversity in education did not
satisfy the first prong of the test. Essentially, the Fourth Circuit
found that if Virginia's goal was really to provide diversity in its
educational system, then the state should have provided such
diversity for women too.8 3 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case,
providing Virginia three options: admit women, establish a
comparable institution for women, or cease to maintain VMI with
state funds.'
Virginia chose to develop a parallel institution for women
called the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL)."5
VWIL, as proposed by Virginia, shunned the rigorous adversative
method of teaching 86 used at VMI for a cooperative model which
their educational task force felt would be more appropriate for
women.87 On remand, the District Court approved VWIL, finding
that the VMI and VWIL could achieve "substantially similar
outcomes.""8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court.8 9 However,
it altered its application of the important governmental
interest/substantially related means test by deferentially
reviewing the important governmental interest. 90 In determining
what an important governmental interest is, the Fourth Circuit

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 900.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 526 (noting that VWIL would be located on the

campus of Mary Baldwin College).

Mary Baldwin is an all-women's, private

liberal arts school. Id. The program, which would be state-sponsored, would
initially accept approximately 25-30 women. Id.
86. See id. at 522 (explaining that the adversative method includes
"[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of

privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable
values"). Id. The adversative method of training also entails using a "rat
line," an intensified version of the adversative method, which is comparable to
the Marine Corps boot camp experience. Id.
87. Id. at 526-27. The Supreme Court points out that Mary Baldwin is
inferior to VMI in the SAT scores of its incoming freshmen, the salaries of its
staff, the number of Ph.D's among professors and in the type of degrees
offered. Id. at 551. Mary Baldwin does not offer degrees in the sciences or in
engineering. Id. at 552.
88. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 481 (W.D. Va. 1994).

89. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d. 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 1236-37.
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held that a court should not substitute its values over those of a
"democratically chosen branch."91 Instead of focusing on the end,
the court held that the means should be more carefully
scrutinized. 9 Applying this new formula, Virginia's objective of
providing single-sex education withstood the test, as did the
means of excluding women."
B. The Supreme Court Decision
By using a subtly heightened form of the "important
governmental interest with substantially related means test," a
level of review she labeled "skeptical scrutiny,"94 Justice Ginsburg
discredited both of Virginia's proffered objectives and ruled that
denying women admission to VMI violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Ginsburg began the Virginia opinion by describing the
"incomparable" opportunities available at VMI, opportunities that
were, at the time of this decision, denied to women. 96 Ginsburg
detailed the unique features of the adversative method, including
the rigorous physical training, the total absence of privacy and the
extreme regulation of behavior.97
Then, taking language from the Hogan opinion, Ginsburg set
forth the "core instruction" which parties seeking to defend a
gender-based classification must demonstrate: "an exceedingly

91. Id. While the Fourth Circuit held that the will of a state's legislature
should be examined deferentially, the court did warn that a "pernicious"
objective should never be upheld. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1239. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit put the proposed remedy
to a third test: whether the men at VMI and the women at VWIL would
receive "substantively comparable" benefits at their respective institutions.
Id. at 1237. Despite the Fourth Circuit's recognition that the two schools
would use different educational approaches and that a VWIL degree would not
come with the same prestige or connections that a VMI degree does, the court
deemed them substantively comparable. Id. at 1241. See also United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (admonishing the Fourth Circuit for
deferentially reviewing the purpose set forth by the State of Virginia).
94. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
95. See id. at 536-46. Ginsburg's majority opinion delivered six votes:
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter and Stevens. Id. at 518.
Justice Thomas did not partake in the decision. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
filed a concurring opinion and Justice Scalia dissented. Id.
96. Id. at 520. Ginsburg makes it clear that the Virginia opinion is
addressed only to an educational which is unique and available only at
"Virginia's premier military institute." Id. at 534 n.7. Ginsburg specifically
says that the opinion is not meant to question the State's ability to support
diverse educational opportunities if it supports such opportunities in an evenhanded manner. Id.
97. Id. at 522.
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persuasive justification."9' She further related that this "skeptical
scrutiny" is necessary to uncover more than a century of
discrimination against women." Ginsburg also noted that while
gender-based classifications are not subject to the same level of
scrutiny that racially motivated classifications are, "the burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State."00 It
is not until after this historical analysis that Ginsburg delineated
that the State must show "at least" that the sex-based
classification "serves important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives."' 10 Importantly, Ginsburg also
stressed that the objective must be genuine and not based on
stereotypical notions about women's talents and proclivities. 102
Performing a "searching analysis," Ginsburg found that
history does not corroborate Virginia's alleged objective of
promoting educational diversity.' °3 In particular, Ginsburg pointed
out that all of Virginia's state-supported single-sex schools became
co-educational in the past thirty years, leaving VMI as the only
state-supported single-sex school."'
Second, Ginsburg dismissed Virginia's argument that
admitting women to VMI would mean altering the adversative
method beyond recognition, finding such a contention to be
overstated and based upon broad generalizations and assumptions
about women. '°5 Ginsburg pointed out that it is undisputed that
some women are certainly capable of meeting the challenges of the
adversative method as it is currently implemented and that the
method is not "inherently unsuitable" for women.0 6 Further,
Ginsburg reminded Virginia that since the seminal Reed. 7 case,
individual qualified women may not be excluded from

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 531.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
Id. at 533.
Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724

(1982)).
102. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
103. Id. at 535.
104. Id. at 540-44.
105. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540-44 (1996) (noting that

arguments and gloomy predictions of a similar nature were made when
women first sought entry to federal military academies).
106. See id. at 540 (observing that some changes undoubtedly must be made
to accommodate females in housing arrangements and physical training
programs). Ginsburg readily noted that while the adversative method may not

be the preferred mode of education for most women, many men would also not
choose such an educational environment. Id. at 542 (citing the Fourth
Circuit's Justice Motz in her dissent from the Court of Appeals' denial of a
rehearing en banc).
107. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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opportunities on the basis of broad stereotypes. 108
Finding that Virginia engaged in circular reasoning when it
set forth single sex education as an important governmental
interest that could only be achieved by the means of excluding
women, Ginsburg asserted that Virginia wrongly focused their
Thus, Ginsburg
argument on "means rather than end.""0 9
determined that Virginia failed to demonstrate an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for excluding women from VMI.10'
Instead, the Court found that VMI's mission statement clearly
spells out its true objective: "to produce citizen-soldiers,
individuals imbued with love of learning.., ready.., to defend
their country in a time of national peril.... This goal, the court
concluded, is surely broad enough to include women. 11
Then focusing her attention on the remedy, Justice Ginsburg
found that it fell far short of placing those disadvantaged by a
constitutional violation "in the position they would have occupied
in the absence of discrimination.".1 3 Namely, the proposed parallel
institution, VWIL, would not offer an opportunity for women to
14
experience the demanding adversative method of training.
Instead, VWIL would be based on a cooperative method of
teaching designed with a female's special psychological needs in
mind.' 1
Further, the military component of VWIL would be
108. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541-42 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725); (citing
also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139, n. 11) (holding it is
unconstitutional to use peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on
the basis of gender).
109. Id. at 545.
110. Id. at 546.
111. Id. at 545.
112. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996). See also id. at 58687 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that by defining true objective as creating
individuals filled with love of learning and patriotism, the Court describes the
mission of every school in Virginia). Justice Scalia's argument is that VMI's
mission is more accurately described as imparting those values in a "military,
adversative, all-male environment" and "that mission is not 'great enough to
accommodate women'." Id. at 587.
113. See id. at 547 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)
(holding that a remedial education plan, requiring the state defendants to pay
one half of the extra costs incurred by the plan, did not violate the Eleventh
Amendment)).
114. Id. at 548.
115. See id. at 549 (describing the many ways in which VWIL is different
and inferior to VMI). For example, women at VWIL would not be required to
eat or live together, thus depriving them of an opportunity to bond in the
barracks. Id. at 548. Also, VWIL students would learn their leadership skills
through seminars and externships instead of through the stressful physical
and mental training which is the hallmark of VMI. Id. at 549. The court also
notes that VMI and VWIL would not be equals in prestige, connections,
facilities, endowments, the types of degrees available or in the level of training
among faculty members. Id. at 551-52.
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"largely ceremonial."1 16
Ginsburg firmly instructed that the remedy should be
designed for the women who applied and were denied admission to
VMI, in other words, it must accommodate the women who are
"capable of all the individual activities required of VMI cadets."1 1 7
Ginsburg did explicitly recognize, however, that admitting women
to VMI would require some changes in terms of allowing each sex
privacy from the other in their living quarters and in altering
some parts of the physical regimen for women. 1 8
In sum,
Ginsburg found that the proposed remedy failed to compensate the
injury of the women who had been denied the opportunity to be
educated at VMI and that further, VWIL was a "pale shadow" of
VMI. 19
C. Raising the Bar:An Exceedingly PersuasiveJustification
The Virginia opinion, Ginsburg's first opportunity to speak for
the Court with respect to the proper standard of review for genderbased classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment, was richly
influenced by the core beliefs that have motivated Ginsburg
throughout her career.
First, the subtle maneuvering that gave the Virginia opinion
its potency is demonstrative of Ginsburg's understanding of the
need to move slowly and build upon existing precedent in order to
avoid finding oneself on a "doctrinal limb." 120 The force behind the
Virginia opinion is found in the ever so slight change in focus from
the
requirement
that
gender-based
classifications
are
"substantially related" to an "important governmental objective" to

116. See id. at 550 (pointing out that while Virginia justified watering down
the militaristic component of VMI for VWIL students because VWIL graduates
would not necessarily pursue a career in the military, only about fifteen
percent of VMI's graduates make a career in the service).
117. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550-51 (1996) (quoting
Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896) (explaining that Virginia was not at liberty to
fashion a remedy for the average woman because it is women who desire to
and are capable of competing at VMI that instituted the lawsuit against

Virginia, and thus the remedy must be created for them).
118. Id. at 551 n.19.
119. See id. at 553 (quoting Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1250 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting), and contrasting all the amenities and intangible benefits of VMI
with VWIL as proposed by Virginia).
120. Ginsburg, Remarks on Women, supra note 20, at 25.

See also

Markowitz, supra note 5, at 346 (reporting that although Ginsburg always
argued forcefully for strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications, Ginsburg
felt that Justice Brennan moved hastily by using strict scrutiny in Frontiero).

Because Justice Stewart was unwilling to embrace the strict scrutiny
approach at that time, the strict scrutiny approach did not command a
majority. Id. Ginsburg's strategy in advocating strict scrutiny early and
forcefully was merely to get the Justices used to the idea. Id.
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the words immediately preceding that test: "exceedingly
persuasive justification. " 2' While the phrase seemed to function
more as an adjective describing the standard two-prong test in
Hogan, 2 "exceedingly persuasive justification" becomes the focus
Apart from labeling the
of the test itself in Virginia.12 3
persuasive
"an exceedingly
requirement of establishing
justification" as the Supreme Court's "core instruction," the phrase
is sometimes left to stand alone in such a way that it appears to
function as the test itself.1 24 The new prominence of the phrase is
also indicated by the strong reaction to its usage prompted in
Justice Scalia's dissent. 2 ' While both Scalia and Rehnquist
121. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523-24 (delineating the test a defendant
classifying on the basis of sex must meet); see also Lee, supra note 16, at 235
(suggesting that the importance placed upon the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification" may have formed a new level of equal protection
scrutiny which Lee labels "intermediate review with teeth"); Collin Connor
Udell, Signaling a New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United
States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521, 553 (1996) (theorizing that the focus
on "exceedingly persuasive justification" is part of Ginsburg's long-held
strategy to move the Court toward endorsing strict scrutiny for sex-based
classifications).
The phrase
122. Mississippi v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).

"exceedingly persuasive justification" was first used in Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (holding that a veterans' preference
statute stipulating that all qualified veterans must be considered for civil
service positions before non-veterans did not violate women's right to equal
protection). The statement reads, "any state law overtly or covertly designed
to prefer males over females in public employment would require an

exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 273;
Lee, supra note 16, at 235.
123. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (providing an
example of the way "exceedingly persuasive justification" is allowed to stand
on its own as a representation of the requirement a party seeking to classify

on the basis of gender must meet); see also Udell, supra note 121, at 541.
124. See id. at 532-33 (providing a prominent example of the new
independence of "exceedingly persuasive justification"). But see id. at 524

(offering an example

of an instance

where "exceedingly

persuasive

justification" reverts to its status as an adjective).
125. See id. at 570-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that Ginsburg's
majority opinion dishonestly applies precedent). Scalia notes that Ginsburg
uses the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" nine different times in
the opinion. Id. at 571. Further, Scalia takes issue with Ginsburg designating
that phrase as the Court's "core instruction." Id. See also id. at 559
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (commenting that the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification" "is best confined ... as it was first used, as an
observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a
formulation of the test itself'). Rehnquist perceives that the while the phrases
"important governmental objective" and "substantially related" are not
"models of precision," they are at least more specific than "exceedingly
persuasive justification," the use of which Rehnquist feels further confuses the
intermediate level of scrutiny. Id.
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objected to the shift in focus, Ginsburg's opinion, with its
designation of the "exceedingly persuasive justification" as the
126
chief requirement of intermediate scrutiny, did garner six votes.
Ginsburg's use of the phrase "exceedingly persuasive
justification" also gave her a tougher weapon to use in exposing
benign justifications and in combating the use of generalizations
about women.
For one, in determining if a justification is
exceedingly persuasive, it is clear from Ginsburg's opinion that the
Court can and will look back to the time the classification was first
used to determine if the rationalization being offered now for such
a classification is the same one that was in mind when the
classification was first established.127 By searching Virginia's
"recent and distant history" for the actual purpose behind
excluding women from VMI, Ginsburg gave some indication that
the basis for the classification at the time it was established must
be valid under today's equal
protection analysis in order to qualify
12
as exceedingly persuasive.
This indication becomes stronger when one considers that
Ginsburg may have been able to disqualify Virginia's proffered
objective of providing diversity in education just by looking at
recent history."' After the Hogan decision came down, VMI
formed a Mission Study Committee to reexamine its single-sex
admission policy. 130 In reporting its decision to remain all male,
the committee focused largely on the potential difficulties with
attracting women. 131 Tellingly, the report did not list diversity in
12
education as a reason for remaining an all-male institution.
Further, as Ginsburg briefly touches upon and as Rehnquist's
concurring opinion notes, even if promoting diversity was
Virginia's motive for establishing VMI, such a motive still violated
the Equal Protection Clause because the diversity favored only one

126. Udell, supra note 121, at 540.
127. See id. at 536-37 (explaining that at the time VMI was founded in 1839,
diversity in education was hardly a concern for state leaders).
128. See id. at 536 (observing that "neither recent nor distant history bears
out Virginia's alleged pursuit of diversity...").
129. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 559-63 (1996) (Rehnquist,

C.J., concurring) (noting that while Virginia ultimately fails to prove that
diversity in education is their actual purpose, it was improper for Ginsburg to
look back to 1839, when VMI was founded, to discern what their actual
purpose in excluding women was). Rehnquist notes that it was not until far
into this century that differential treatment of men and women by the law was
even thought to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 560. Further, even

if VMI's classification is unconstitutional by today's standards, it was clearly
not unconstitutional in 1839. Id.
130. Id. at 539.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 562, n.*** (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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133

Thus, the availability of other arguments with which
Ginsburg could have discredited Virginia's alleged objective
suggests that Ginsburg fully intended to make the exceedingly
persuasive requirement tougher to meet by demanding that the
objective be the actual one in mind at the time the discriminatory
classification was devised. Such an intent on Ginsburg's part
would be completely consistent with her long-held goal to expose
benign justifications."' Further, demanding that the proffered
justification is borne out by history is a way to make the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" even more difficult to prove
even without the benefit of implementing a "strict scrutiny" form
of review"
Writing the Virginia opinion also gave Ginsburg the
opportunity to condemn a practice she fought throughout her
career as a litigator: trapping women with stereotypes and
generalizations.'36 In Virginia, Ginsburg held that attempts to
exclude individual women by setting forth what the average
woman can or cannot do will not qualify as an exceedingly
persuasive justification.' 37 In Virginia, Ginsburg conceded that
most women would not want to attend VMI. 13 8 However, she
shifted the focus of the opinion onto the women who would want to
attend VMI. By making the relevant question "whether the State
can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and
capacity, the training and attendant opportunity that VMI
uniquely
affords," Ginsburg precluded
the State from
discriminating against women based upon broad generalizations
about what most women are good at or prefer.'39

133. Id. at 540, 562 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
134. See generally Ginsburg, Benign Classification, supra note 17 (analyzing
cases which attempted to expose the myth that the law's differential
treatment of women helps or benefits them).
135. In some ways, Ginsburg was following O'Connor's method of analysis in
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 (1982). In Hogan,
O'Connor looked back to 1971, the year Mississippi University for Women's

nursing school enrolled its first class, to see if women at that time were
disadvantaged from entering nursing school as a means of discrediting
Mississippi's alleged objective of compensating women for past discrimination.
Id. at 729-30. Ginsburg, however, took such analysis a step further in
reaching all the way back to 1839, the year VMI was founded. United States

v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996).
136. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (holding
that a provision of the Social Security Act which provided funds for child care
when the male breadwinner dies, but not when the female breadwinner dies,

was unconstitutional).
137. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541-42.

138. Id. at 542.
139. Id.
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It is not clear that the use of the exceedingly persuasive
justification standard was necessary to debunk the various
arguments Virginia made based upon the average tendencies of
women. " ' Since the turning point at Reed, 14 1 the Court has warned
that differential treatment of women by the law cannot be justified
by "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females." "2 However, Ginsburg did seem to take the Court's
prohibition on excluding women based on generalizations one step
further. Apart from reiterating that excluding on the basis of
stereotypes of how women "are" is unacceptable, Ginsburg made it
clear that excluding women on the basis of real, inherent physical
143
differences between men and women is also unacceptable.
Ginsburg explains that "inherent differences" between men and
women may not be used as grounds for belittling women or as an
"artificial constraint on an individual's opportunity.",1 4 Bearing
this in mind, Ginsburg found that even though VMI would have to
make accommodations for women with respect to providing
privacy from the other sex in their living quarters and also in
adjusting physical training programs, the need for such changes
could not stand as a barrier to admitting women. 14 The important

140. See Udell, supra note 121, at 553 (commenting that Scalia's "hyberbolic"
dissent ignores that ignores that "sex-based differences in the average do not
justify gender discrimination"); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975) (providing an example of a case not decided under the "exceedingly
persuasive justification" standard in which the Supreme Court held that legal
classifications cannot be based on stereotypes of the average woman). Despite
precedent such as Wiesenfeld, directing that women cannot be discriminated
against on the basis of stereotypical notions and generalizations, Justice
Scalia commented in his dissent that: "only the amorphous 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' phrase, and not the standard elaboration of
intermediate scrutiny, can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI's singlesex composition is unconstitutional because there exist several women willing
and able to undertake VMI's program." Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Further, Scalia believes that in focusing on the minority of women who are
willing and able to attend VMI, instead of upon the majority who are not,
Ginsburg engages in a least-restrictive means analysis, thus far reserved for
examinations under "strict scrutiny." Id. at 2295.
141. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
142. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)); see also
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding that male plaintiff
could not be denied Social Security benefits normally allocated to women in
order to care for his newborn son).
143. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34 (reminding that "sex classifications" can be
used as a grounds for compensating women for past wrongs, but not "to create
or perpetuate the legal, social and economic inferiority of women").
144. Id. at 533.
145. Id. at 540. Ginsburg notes that while men and women joining the
Military, Naval and Air Force Academies had to meet identical criteria in
terms of academics, "minimum essential adjustments" were made because of
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point for Ginsburg is that the adversative method is not inherently
46
unsuitable for women, and as such, can be used to train them.'
By requiring VMI to adjust their program to women's physical
needs, Ginsburg ensures that differences in a woman's physiology
will not be used as a means of keeping women from enjoying all
the opportunities that men do when those physical differences do
not form the crux of an opportunity.
While Ginsburg's analysis of Virginia's proffered objectives
gave her the opportunity to reaffirm the fact that those objectives
cannot be based on generalizations about women, her analysis of
the proposed remedy, VWIL, gave Ginsburg the opportunity to
institute her belief in equal treatment of men and women under
the law.'47 In evaluating VWIL, Ginsburg specifically noted that
the program was "unequal in tangible and intangible facilities." 4 '
In finding such inequality, Ginsburg went so far as to compare the
schools in terms of the SAT scores of incoming students, the
number of Ph.D's among faculty members, the size of the schools'
endowments, the networking opportunities available, and even the
number and type of athletic fields.'49 By scrutinizing such aspects
of VWIL, Ginsburg sent a clear message that if a state wishes to
maintain separate institutions for men and women, those
institutions must be equal in a very specific sense of the word.'
By requiring such equality, Ginsburg makes it so that a State
would need to have a serious commitment to its goal of
separateness in order to make it worthwhile to create a roughly
identical facility for women."'
"physiological differences" between male and females. Id. at 551 n. 19.

146. Id. at 540.
147. See generally Ginsburg, Special Versus Equal Treatment, supra note 31
(expounding upon the pitfalls of treating women differently, as opposed to
equally, to men).
148. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
149. Id. at 551-53.
150. See id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (disagreeing that an
adequate remedy for VMI's constitutional violation needed to be a "VMI clone
for women"). Rehnquist stated in his opinion that an adequate remedy would
have been a demonstration by Virginia that they have an equal interest in
providing single-sex education for men and women. Id. In order to show that
interest, "[t]he state does not need to create two institutions with the same
number of faculty Ph.D's, similar SAT scores or comparable athletic fields." Id.
Rather, Rehnquist feels it would be sufficient to create two institutions of the
same calibre. Id.

151. See id. at 553 (likening VWIL to the solution proposed by the State of
Texas in Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950)). In Sweatt, subsequent to a
ruling that said denying African Americans entry to a state-run law school
violates the Equal Protection Clause, the State of Texas attempted to keep
African Americans from attending the University of Texas Law School by
setting up a separate institution for them. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631-32. In

comparing the law school for African Americans with the one available to
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One main area upon which Ginsburg based her finding of
VWIL's inequality is the fact that VWIL would deny women the
opportunity to experience the sense of accomplishment that comes
with enduring the rigors of the adversative treatment." Instead
of using a military-style method of educating, VWIL would have
instituted a cooperative method."' The reasons proffered by VWIL
proponents for implementing the cooperative method at VWIL, as
opposed to the adversative method, are the supposed differences in
women's and men's psychological makeup as well as their
dissimilar developmental needs." 4 While Justice Ginsburg refuted
this argument on the grounds that women whose abilities "place
them outside the average description" 5 cannot be discriminated
against based on stereotypes, Virginia's use of supposed feminine
"differences" to women's disadvantage underscores the wisdom of
Ginsburg's belief that women must be treated equally, and not
specially.15
Ginsburg herself does not treat men and women as
interchangeable equals. She necessarily allows that at VMI
women must have privacy from men and concedes that minimal
changes will have to be made in women's physical regimen.1 1 7 In
whites, the Court found that the former was sorely lacking in resources. Id. at
632-33. The Sweatt Court also compared the two schools in terms of
intangible resources "which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness" such as faculty reputation and the standing in the
community. Id. at 634. In conclusion, the Court found that Texas failed to
show "substantial equality" in the two institutions. Id. at 633.
152. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548. As Ginsburg put it, "Kept away from the
pressures, hazards and psychological bonding characteristic of VMI's
adversative training, VWIL students will not know the 'feeling of tremendous
accomplishment' commonly experienced by VMI's successful cadets." Id. at
549.
153. Id. at 548.
154. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476-77 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(explaining that a study of women's psychological needs confirms that because
women "generally" have less self-confidence than men, the adversative method
would be an ineffective method and even counterproductive method of
educating women).
155. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (setting forth
the proposition that the proposed remedy must be tailored to the women who
want to attend VMI and are capable of all its rigors).
156. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
research documenting women's different and "deep-seated" developmental
needs supports the proposition that it is beneficial to educate men and women
in different environments).
157. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551 n.19. See also Abrams, supra note 31, at 880
(commenting that while Ginsburg does a commendable job of depicting the
complexities of women and gender discrimination, she never says that women
are "indistinguishable from men"); Ginsburg, Full Members, supra note 56, at
6 (pointing out that the Equal Rights Amendment would have prohibited
gender as a basis of legal classification with two exceptions). The exceptions
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allowing for such differences, Ginsburg in no way says that women
have any special sensibilities or developmental needs which would
better respond to an educational method other than the
adversative method.15 Rather, Ginsburg merely does not want
undeniable physical differences between the sexes to prevent
women from enjoying opportunities otherwise available.
D. A Woman's Work is Never Done: Future Battles Outlined in the
Concurringand Dissenting Opinions
While the Virginia opinion provided Ginsburg with the
opportunity to raise the standard of review for gender-based
discrimination claims one step closer to the strict scrutiny she set
out to establish in Reed v. Reed,"' the opinion fell short of
The concurring and
instituting such a level of review. 16
particularly the dissenting opinion offer some insights into some of
the opposition Ginsburg has to face before she can take the final
step of instituting strict scrutiny.
While Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion recognizes and
takes issue with the fact that Ginsburg used the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification" as the test litigants must
meet when they classify on the basis of gender, his disagreement
"relate to personal privacy and physical characteristics unique to one sex." Id.
The first is what Ginsburg terms the "potty problem." Ginsburg, Fourteenth
and Equal Rights Amendments, supra note 8, at 175. Ginsburg explains that
the "ERA would coexist peacefully with separate public restrooms, separate
sleeping and bathroom facilities for male and female military personnel and
prisoners." Id. Second, legislation dealing with subjects such as sperm
donation or pre-natal care could discriminate on the basis of sex. Id. Note
that these categories of exceptions are very similar to the ones Ginsburg is
allowing in Virginia. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (emphasizing that
"'inherent differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate,
remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration .... )
158. But see Kupetz, supra note 16, at 1364-65 (arguing that as a lawyer
Ginsburg sought to totally eliminate stereotypical treatment of women in the
law, but that in the Virginia opinion, Ginsburg "called upon a Gilliganesque
model of gender differences, pointing out that inherent differences between
men and women would 'remain cause for celebration'); Kovacic-Fleischer,
supra note 31, at 863 (observing that the Virginia opinion is a drastic change
from the view that "if women want male opportunities, they must look and
behave like men"). However, Kovacic-Fleisher does note that, in her opinion,
Ginsburg's willingness to make changes in women's physical regimen
"reflect(s) the possibility of removing a requirement geared to one gender, but
unnecessary to the achievement of the goal of the institution" and thus allows
qualified persons of either gender to partake in VMI. Id.
159. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
160. See Reed Brief,supra note 11, at 14 (outlining in detail the reasons that
sex should be a proscribed classification, subject to strict scrutiny); Udell,
supra note 121, at 558-59 (noting that while the door is open to implementing
strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications, the Virginia court did not walk
through it).
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centered upon the ambiguity of the term. 161 However, he did not
specifically disagree with the idea of raising the level of required
scrutiny. 162 Rehnquist merely says that for clarity purposes, he
would have clung more closely to the "firmly established"
intermediate scrutiny test.163 Thus, it is unclear from this opinion
exactly how Rehnquist would react to the idea of raising the level
of scrutiny for gender-based claims.
Scalia's dissenting opinion, on the other hand, clearly outlines
some of the ideological obstacles Ginsburg may face on the road to
implementing strict scrutiny as the standard of review for genderbased discrimination claims. Scalia makes it clear in his dissent
that he believes Virginia's proffered objective of providing diverse
and effective education by maintaining a single-sex school satisfied
the "important governmental objective with substantially related
means" test."' According to Scalia, only the application of a leastrestrictive means analysis could have yielded the majority's
conclusion that Virginia's maintenance of VMI violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 1' Most importantly, Scalia states that the

161. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 559 (1996) (acknowledging
that while terms like "important governmental interest" and "exceedingly
persuasive justification" from the traditional intermediate scrutiny test are
not very well-defined terms themselves, Rehnquist believes they have more
specificity than does exceedingly persuasive justification).
162. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). While Rehnquist does not specifically
come out against raising the level of scrutiny, the other areas of Ginsburg's
opinion with which he takes issue indicate areas of potential resistance. Id. at
565. For example, Rehnquist does not believe that VMI's constitutional
violation should have been defined as excluding women from experiencing a
unique and extraordinary method of education.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). Rather, he believes that Virginia could have met the demands of
the Constitution by merely demonstrating "that its interest in educating men
in a single-sex environment is matched by its interest in educating women in a
single-sex institution." Id. Further, Rehnquist does not believe that the allwomen's school would have to be substantially similar in terms of curriculum
or facilities to the all-men's school. Id. Rehnquist believes that the two
schools would only need to be equal in "quality of education" and "calibre." Id.
163. Id. at 559.
164. Id. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia believes that it is "beyond
question" that the State of Virginia has an interest in providing a good
education for its citizens. Id. Scalia then cites to findings made at the district
court level which state that undisputed studies show that single-sex schools
provide a superior education than their co-educational counterparts. Id. at
576-66 (citing United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (W.D. VA.
1991)). Scalia believes that the strength of these statistics documenting the
benefits of single-sex education should have been enough on their own to show
that VMI met the constitutional requirements. Id. at 577.
165. See id. at 579 (arguing that the majority opinion's biggest error was to
find that VMI was unconstitutional because there were some women who were
capable of handling all the rigors of VMI). According to Scalia, this is an
"unacknowledged adoption" of strict scrutiny which does not have basis in
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Court has held outright that strict scrutiny is inapplicable to sexbased classifications, and that further, he does not believe that
there is a strong
argument for applying strict scrutiny to such
66
classifications. 1
As support for his argument, Justice Scalia cites to a footnote
in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,167 which intimates that
strict scrutiny may be called for where there is a "discrete and
insular minorit[y]." 68 The famed footnote says that being a
member of such a minority may constitute a "special condition
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." 169 Justice Scalia believed, however, that it was "hard to
consider women a 'discrete and insular minority' unable to employ
'the political processes ordinarily to be relied upon,' when they
constitute a majority of the electorate.' 76
Scalia's argument is not a new one, and Ginsburg answered
such criticisms in the past. 17' For one, Ginsburg wrote that "[siex,

precedent. Id.
166. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574-75 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). As support for the proposition that the Court has explicitly
refused to apply strict scrutiny for classification based on gender, Scalia cites
such cases as Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (holding through the
application of intermediate scrutiny, that a pension offset provision which
applied to nondependent men but not to similarly situated nondependent
women did not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment) and
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding
through the application of intermediate scrutiny, that a statutory rape law
which applied only to men, did not unconstitutionally discriminate on the
basis of gender). Additionally, Scalia states that if the level of scrutiny for
gender-cased classifications should change at all, there is a better argument
for changing it to the easier rational-related standard of review than there is
to change it to strict scrutiny. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 574-75 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia's personal philosophy regarding strict scrutiny is that the
Court has said that strict scrutiny is reserved for race and national originbased classifications and for "classifications affecting fundamental rights." Id.
at 567 (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). In Scalia's opinion,
fundamental rights should be limited to those rights which are "traditionally
protected by our society." Id.
167. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
168. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Carlone Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
169. Id.
170. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (arguing that treating women as a
minority who is unable to exercise its political power is to treat women in the
same solicitous manner that the majority opinion is denouncing in Virginia).
171. See, Brief for Appellee at 15-18, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (No. 71-1694) (demonstrating that in Frontiero, the Solicitor General
made three arguments as to why sex, unlike race, should not be considered a
suspect classification). For one, Scalia argued that race distinctions have been
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like race, is a visible, immutable biological characteristic that
bears no necessary relationship to ability. 2 Further, Ginsburg
pointed out that although women were given the vote earlier this
century, it cannot be ignored that women did not have this
privilege until well into this century. 173 Additionally, in response
to the charge that gender classifications should not be ranked a
suspect classification because women are a numerical majority,
not a discrete and insular minority, Ginsburg points out that being
a discrete and insular minority can be advantageous in the sense
that it makes political organization and mobilization more
simple. 74 Further, even though women may be strong in number,
their power is diluted because women are separated by class,
economics, and geography.1 These same arguments still ring true
today, and it is clear from Scalia's dissent that Ginsburg will need
to make them again in her quest to implement strict scrutiny for
gender-based classifications.
CONCLUSION

While Justice Ginsburg has not yet succeeded in convincing
treated more disfavorably than sex distinctions in Constitutional history. Id.
Second, being that women are a numerical majority, they are better able to
exercise their political power to protect their rights than are minorities. Id.
Third, while the legislation affecting minorities is "commonly perceived as
implying a stigma of inferiority or a badge of opprobrium," the same is not
true of the legislation affecting women. Id.; Udell, supra note 121, at 554-56
(setting forth that arguments likening gender to race retain their validity, and
that further, Ginsburg has responded to CaroleneProductsarguments before).
172. Ginsburg, Full Members, supra note 56, at 3-4. In comparing race and
gender as classifications in the Reed Brief Ginsburg wrote, "[b]oth
classifications create large, natural classes, membership in which is beyond
the individual's control .... Arguments justifying different treatment for the
sexes on the grounds of female inferiority, need for male protection, and
happiness in their assigned role bear a striking resemblance to the half-truths
surrounding the myth of the 'happy slave."' Reed Brief, supra note 11, at 1516. In her brief for Frontiero v. Richardson, Ginsburg left out the detailed
comparisons of racial discrimination to gender-based discrimination because
she had become more in tune with the fact that different groups are
discriminated against in different ways. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 344.
173. Ginsburg, Full Members, supra note 56, at 4.
174. Id.
175. Id. In her Reed Brief, Ginsburg thoroughly outlined the reasons why
sex should be treated similarly to race. Reed Brief, supra note 11, at 15.
Ginsburg wrote: "As other groups have been assisted toward full equality via
the suspect class doctrine, women lack political power to remedy the
discriminatory treatment they are accorded in the law and in society
generally." Id. at 25. Further, Ginsburg listed some of the ways that women
were still treated as inferiors in the law, even in the 1970's. Id. at 32. For
example, a wife's domicile is generally legally dictated to be that of her
husband's. Id. Also, in 1971, women were required to serve on juries on an
equal basis with men in only 28 states. Id. at 35.
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the Supreme Court to implement strict scrutiny for legal
classifications made on the basis of gender, there is no question
that under her leadership, women have made great strides toward
achieving equality in the eyes of the law. From convincing the
Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment should extend its
protections to women, to handing women their strongest weapon
yet to fight gender discrimination in the law, Ginsburg has helped
bring about an extraordinary amount of change in the last 28
years. Clearly, from atop her position on the highest court in the
land, Ginsburg is now in a better position than ever to influence
the Court to dynamically interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to
accord its fullest protections to women.176

176. See Ginsburg, Full Members supra note 56, at 3 (commenting that the
Fourteenth Amendment has been dynamically interpreted to include two other
classifications, alienage and national origin). Alienage and national origin
were not originally meant to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, like race and gender-based classifications, they are classifications
that distinguish persons "on the basis of who they are, rather than what they
have done or are capable of doing." Id.

